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The dilemmas of political legitimacy 
Francisco C. Weffort* 
Urgency —the awareness of this urgency— is (...) the essential characteristic of 
the contemporary Latin American scene. 
The democratic formula may perish, consumed by the ravages of ineffective-
ness. But its death may also be due to a galloping anaemia in the vital sap of its 
legitimacy. It is important at this point not to entertain any delusions about 
either threat; the second is much more serious and implacable than the first, (...) 
the complete evaporation of beliefs, and the total moral collapse implied by the 
dissolution of that faith —universal anomy in the whole body of society— 
breeds only despair and extremism. 
José Medina Echavarria 
The concept of political legitimacy implies a 
debate about democracy and politics or, better 
still, about the possibility of democracy recover-
ing control over the direction of politics after a 
period in which authoritarian régimes, which 
did not lack a certain technocratic flavour, discre-
dited democracy to the point of rendering it 
ridiculous. This means accepting, of course, that 
the concept of political legitimacy contains an 
affirmation of principle, one moreover funda-
mental to any genuinely democratic thinking, 
which is the primacy of the logic of history over 
the logic of expediency. 
The fact that we are beginning with some 
abstract conceptual background should not 
prompt anyone to imagine, fearfully, that the 
dilemmas of political legitimacy compel us all to 
take off into the stratosphere. No, at least not all 
the time. The truth is that when we speak of 
political legitimacy we are also, and primarily, 
speaking about very real and very dramatic facts 
of an historical epoch: of the very epoch in which 
we happen to live. 
In an important work of the early 1960s entitled 
Consideraciones sociológicas sobre el desarrollo 
económico de América Latina^ José Medina, 
•Staff member of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural 
Studies (CEDEC). 
The combination of theoretical reasoning with 
sensitivity to the living experience of history is one of 
the most attractive features of the thinking of José 
Medina Echavarria, the great Spanish teacher who, 
after the Civil War, made Latin America his second 
country. I also suspea that it will not escape the student 
of sociology and politics that many of the thoughts 
which I am about to offer owe their inspiration to 
Medina, even though the aim is to understand a 
historical period in which he, unfortunately, can no 
longer participate. And, as was characteristic of his 
thinking, and indeed of any thinking which seeks to 
illumine events and ideas, it is necessary whenever 
possible to begin by defining what you are talking about. 
That is precisely why concepts exist and why the first 
part of this article deals mainly with concepts. I examine 
subsequently the crisis of certain Latin American 
countries. (I know that all of them are in crisis but I refer 
only to some of them.) And in the last section I deal 
with the dilemmas which I regard as the current 
dilemmas of political legitimacy and the possibility {only 
a dream?) of building democracy in this part of the 
world 
with his eyes open to current history, offers a 
basic description of what sociology and political 
science understand by political legitimacy: "the 
gap in the power structure which still tolerates 
the inadequate transformation of the historical 
political parties which forged in the past —and 
I 
Legitimacy: description of a concept 
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with great success— the system of property is a 
very serious vacuum because it leaves the roots of 
legitimacy hanging in the air, without support".1 
On the following page Medina adds, in an 
attempt to give concrete meaning to the concept: 
"It is not impossible that the old classes —the 
oligarchies of yesteryear—may be capable of 
winning a new legality if they exert themselves 
to update their political 'formula'." And he con-
tinues: "The new organizations —which per-
haps have too many defects and shortcomings— 
of the most important forces of production (...) 
of modern industrial societies try to fill by peace-
ful efforts the power vacuum left by the decline 
of the age-old oligarchy (...)." With his charac-
teristic synthesizing skill, Medina puts to the 
reader, together with the basic description of a 
fundamental concept of sociology and politics, 
the key questions of a whole historical epoch. I 
will summarize them in four points: 
Firstly, when we speak of political legitimacy 
we refer above all else to the existence, beliefs, 
standards and values —as suggested by Max 
Weber, of whose work Medina was indeed the 
main advocate in Latin America— which shape 
the arena of social actions and relations, these 
actions and relations being ways associated with 
the notion of mutual understanding among the 
actors. In the specific case of politics, there is talk 
of the legitimacy of a leader in the eyes of his 
followers, of a government in the eyes of the 
citizens of a republic, of a political party in the 
eyes of its electors, of a class (or élite) as leader of 
a society, etc. In all cases imaginable, political 
legitimacy is characterized, however, by a feature 
specific to the legitimacy of social domination in 
general And, again according to Weber, the legi-
timacy of a relation of social domination will lie 
in the fact that a person who obeys an order does 
so as if the order came from an internal disposi-
tion, or as if obeying was something in his own 
interest: "A certain minimum of willingness to 
obey, i.e., of (external or internal) interest ¡n 
obeying, is essential in any genuine relation of 
authority."2 In short, the root of the legitimacy of 
authority lies in the consent of the person who 
'José Medina Echavarría, Consideraciones sociológicas sobre 
el desarrollo económico de A m erica Latina, Buenos Aires: Editora 
Solar/Hachette, 1964. 
2Max Weber, Wirtschafl undGesellscbaft. It is interesting to 
note chat José Medina Echavarría was the main translator of this 
'obeys. Thus we have a very clearly defined con-
cept which can be subjected to very accurate and 
very specific analysis. 
In any event, I think it is important to point 
out that Medina, and ¡n this case as well he was 
adhering to the spirit of Weberian sociology, 
invests the concept with a much broader mean-
ing. With reference to political legitimacy he 
mentions, in addition to relations of political 
domination, the existence of a social system. He 
refers to the system of property, which he. 
believes to contain the matrix of the social, eco-
nomic and political organization of traditional 
Latin America. The presence of this system is 
quite obvious at the political level. For Medina, 
property is "both protector and oppressor, i.e., 
authoritarian and paternal. And this image of 
the relations of subordination —protection and 
obedience, arbitrary acts and kindness, faithful-
ness and resentment, violence and gentleness— 
(...) is maintained intact for a long time when the 
king is succeeded by the President of the Repub-
lic. The model of authority created by property 
extends and penetrates into all the relations of 
authority and embodies the persisting represen-
tation of the people in the model".3 
In the 1960s, when Medina wrote this book, 
the society and the State which the system of 
property had produced were in the third or 
fourth decade of their ongoing crisis, a long crisis 
which brought clearly into focus the ruins of a 
disappearing epoch, at the same time that it 
announced the emergence of a new historical 
phase. For Medina, this was the appearance of a 
new society, of a new, modern, urban and indus-
trial social system, no longer rooted in property 
but in business and the town. 
Secondly, when we speak of political legiti-
macy we refer not only to a social system but also 
to a ruling class. In Medina, the concept of ruling 
class has various origins which will be described 
below. However, the investigation has declared 
origins in the young Max Weber, wrestling with 
the vicissitudes of the Bismarckian system and 
seeking another class to rule Germany which 
great work of Weber's into Spanish. The first edition of this work 
in Spanish dates to 1944, i.e., to the time of the Second World War; 
Medina, who at that time was in exile in Mexico, had drafted the 
"Introductory note to the first Spanish edition ". 
'Medina Echavarría, op. cit., p, 34. 
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was not the "old class" of the Junkers. Weber 
provides the model, but the investigation is typi-
cally Latin American: "In the Latin America of 
today, where are the groups of men capable of 
completing the intensive process of transforma-
tion which is shaking the continent? To which 
classes can we turn for support? To the political 
class born of the system of property which gov-
erned, not unsuccessfully, for a long period of its 
history? To the new bourgeois class born of 
exports and industry? To the very new proletar-
ian class, barely organized and with scant expe-
rience of ruling?"4 
In the 1960s, many of us who worked with 
Medina —and we benefitted both from his 
exceptional culture and from his breadth of mind 
and his kindly tolerance of differing opinions, in 
particular those of his disciples— invested the 
concept of ruling class with a much larger and 
more ambitious meaning. It was without the 
slightest doubt an echo of our fascination with a 
certain concept of a Marxism which I will not call 
vulgar, but certainly romantic. Following the 
example of the redeeming mission which the 
young Marx attributed to the proletariat, the 
ruling class was something more than merely a 
ruling class: it was for some of us the vehicle of 
the potential of the future, of the global evolu-
tion of society and of a dream of the redemption 
of mankind. It is interesting to note that this 
idealization of the concept of ruling class —a 
concept constructed on the Utopian expecta-
tions invested in the proletariat— retained its 
validity, even when the class in question, as a 
candidate for power, was the bourgeoisie. This 
can easily be verified in the writings of those 
who still believed at that time in the historical 
possibilities of the so-called "national bourgeoi-
sie". Moreover, many of those who thought in 
this way were indeed of Marxist training. 
Medina certainly regarded the ruling class as 
having a capacity for action and transformation 
with respect to society, but, interpreting the 
concept in a meaning closer to Gaetano Mosca, 
Raymond Aron and Schumpeter, he conceived of 
an historical protagonist of more modest (more 
realistic?) proportions. As the vehicle of a 
"political formula", i.e., of a set of justifications 
for an order and a system, the ruling class must 
Hbid, p 76. 
propose a régime, or a "legality", which must be 
legitimate (for as we know, not all legality is 
legitimate) and effective. Furthermore, it must 
be capable of "completing" a process of 
transformation which is already under way, i.e., 
the metamorphosis of Latin America into a 
modern urban and industrial society. 
We are therefore far from the notion of 
revolutionary negativity which in Marxism char-
acterizes both the proletariat today and the bour-
geoisie at the time of its revolutionary rise. In the 
same way, Medina distances himself from the 
unified or unifying vision which Marxism, 
through the strength of its concept of the social 
whole, identifies in the ruling class. (An example 
of this thoroughgoing unitarism is Marx's fam-
ous proposal: the dominant ideas of an epoch are 
the ideas of the dominant class.) But we are also 
far from the fragmentary approaches of some 
contemporary sociologies which are dazzled by 
the spirit (or lack of spirit?) of what they call 
post-modernism. For in these fragmentary 
approaches, which are content with their own 
inadequacy, both the notion of the governance of 
society and the notion of society itself lose their 
meaning, or at least the sense of global society 
which traditional sociology has always attached 
to them, whether the source is Marx, Durkheim 
or Weber. 
For a sociology such as Medina's, an out-
standing example of traditional sociology, the 
fragmentary view of society and the fragmenta-
tion of thinking should be understood as addi-
tional means of expression of a crisis which is so 
prolonged that it seems to threaten, in our times, 
the very possibility of a logic of history. Medina 
thinks, as he puts it, like "an old liberal", and this 
means that he thinks like a man who believes in 
human rationality, without that circumstance 
preventing him from seeing all the violence and 
irrationality of which men are also capable. Des-
pite all the great dramas and tragedies which he 
happened to witness during his life, despite fas-
cism and the Spanish Civil War, despite Nazi 
and Stalinist totalitarianism, despite the great 
Latin American crisis, Medina believes that his-
tory has a meaning and that it is the task of 
reason to try to comprehend it. After all these 
"despites", there should not remain in Medina 
(or in us) many grounds for excessive optimism. 
But reason must nevertheless make the attempt, 
unless it is to become barren once and for all. 
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The sociological (political) identification of 
a ruling class is the very essence of such an 
attempt. The question Who rules? is also a ques-
tion about the meaning of society and its history. 
Medina examines the history of Latin America 
from this standpoint and accords the oligarchies 
of the past the merit of having established them-
selves in their time as the ruling class which 
believes itself on the side of property. Similarly, 
from this standpoint he also expects that this 
ruling class will be replaced by another, which 
emerges "by peaceful efforts" in the process of 
the formation of a new urban and industrial 
society. 
Thirdly, the concept of political legitimacy 
therefore militates against recognition of the 
existence in society of a power structure. Or, as 
was the case in the 1960s, and still is the case in 
many countries, of a power crisis. Medina speaks 
both of a power crisis, of a "gap in the power 
structure", and of a political vacuum: "a very 
serious vacuum because it leaves the roots of 
legitimacy hanging in the air, without support". 
And there were those who argued, convinced 
more by the sound of the words than by their 
meaning and in the pompous tones of false dis-
coveries, that politics, like physics, abhors a 
vacuum —an argument based on words and 
therefore of little value. 
The point in this case is the importance 
which Medina attaches to the concept of legiti-
macy. When he uses the metaphors of "vacuum" 
and "gap in the power structure", he is merely 
trying to underline something which is often 
forgotten: power is not based only on effective-
ness (or even on strength); it has to be legiti-
mate. And, as he says in a thought which shocks 
many people, "when it comes to the pinch, legiti-
macy is more important than effectiveness", or 
further on: "People who have inherited the best 
European tradition will always prefer the possi-
bility of dialogue or, if you like, the perhaps 
intangible value of legitimacy, over the pragma-
tism of effectiveness".5 Could you ask for greater 
democratic clarity? Could you ask for greater 
clarity in a criticism of the technocratic evil of a 
logic of expediency which distorted the meaning 
of the politics of the 1960s and which, even more 
Hbid, p. 129. 
seriously, continued to distort the meaning of 
politics under the authoritarian régimes of the 
following decades? 
Fourthly, the question of political legitimacy 
relates directly to the institutional question, the 
question of political régimes and, in particular 
the question of political parties. As Medina sees 
it, the crisis of legitimacy in Latin America is 
linked directly to the crisis of the "historical 
parties". These are, for example, the Blancos and 
the Colorados in Uruguay, the Republicans in 
the Brazil of the First Republic and, in a more 
general sense, the liberals and conservatives 
found on all sides in the old oligarchic régimes of 
Latin America. I think that this is a specially 
significant point, when we remember, with 
Enzo Faletto, that the preoccupation with insti-
tutional machinery was not in fashion in the 
1960s. At least among sociologists (but it was 
really more than that —we could speak in this 
case of the majority of Latin American intellec-
tuals), the institutional question had fallen quite 
out of fashion.6 
Medina was thus swimming against the tide 
when he asserted that political legitimacy, in 
addition to being a question relating to the social 
system, to the relations between the classes and 
to the power structure, was also a question of the 
then despised institutional forms. When we 
speak of political legitimacy, we also speak of 
political parties, of electoral systems, and of 
government régimes, matters which prompt 
lengthy digressions in Consideraciones socioló-
gicas sobre el desarrollo económico de América 
Latina. The question of political legitimacy 
therefore begs the question of "legality", i.e., the 
whole body of legal institutions which shape the 
organization of power. 
In short, when we speak of political legiti-
macy, we speak of political democracy, of the 
democracy which exists or the one which we 
want to come into existence. "Democracy is, 
above all, a belief, an illusion if you like, a princi-
ple of legitimacy."7 For, as he says a little earlier, 
in the immediately preceding paragraph: "... 
democratic systems depend above all on a con-
vention, i.e., on the belief in the legitimacy of the 
élite". 
61 refer to the participation of Enzo Faletto in the seminar on 
Changing Development Styles in the Future of Latin America. 
'Medina Echavarria, op. cit., p. 140. 
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II 
Legitimacy and hegemony: historical concepts 
These four requirements which I associate with 
the notion of political legitimacy should not be 
understood as merely analytical terms which, as 
such, would be valid for any historical period. 
The historical meaning of theoretical proposals 
of this kind can be understood when Medina 
acknowledges, for example, in the oligarchic 
classes of this period of crisis some capacity to 
rule and some concept of national unity, but he 
also finds in them an attachment to their private 
interests which is too great to allow them to act 
effectively as ruling classes. We are thus dealing 
with an historical constellation in which, on the 
one hand, the new Lefts, owing both to the 
urgency of their immediate problems and to 
their own structure and idealistic dreams, have a 
weak concept of national legitimacy and, as a 
whole, possess weak instincts for power and 
rule.8 We find ourselves, as already pointed out, 
in the field of the celebrated thinking of Max 
Weber. In order to indicate how far such situa-
tions can go, Medina makes many references to 
events subsequent to Weber, specifically the 
Weimar Republic, with its connotation of the 
fragility of civilization and democracy in the 
path of the brutal avalanche of irrationality and 
violence. 
The concept of political legitimacy therefore 
has a broad political significance in the thinking 
of José Medina and compels reflection on aspects 
of the formation of Latin America and of the 
Latin American States, at least since the inde-
pendence movements, many of which were 
accompanied by historical waves created in 
Europe by Napoleon's ambitions. "... the fact 
that liberty —the democratic and constitutional 
aspiration— is one of the essential elements of 
the original constellation of Latin America, also 
entails the first great paradox of its history: to 
have maintained for so long, in complete contra-
diction, the formulas of an ideology side by side 
with the "beliefs" and actual behaviour of daily 
existence. Over the body of an agrarian structure 
and traditional way of life was spread the flimsy 
cloak of a predominantly liberal and urban 
doctrine."9 
In this case, therefore, the construction of 
legitimate political systems was always more 
difficult and it affected the very possibility of the 
existence of a State in our countries. The State 
emerged whenthe contradiction was resolved, as 
it was, moreover, by means of some form of 
compromise. This "contradiction had its 
weaknesses and compromises in many places; 
and where this occurred —as in the case of 
Chile— the genuine organization of the State 
began early". Taking Chile, where the State was 
formed much earlier than in the other countries, 
as an exception, Medina bases his general rule on 
the formation of the national State in Argentina, 
taking the battle of Monte Caseros as the 
starting point. And he adds that where this 
compromise occurred, we have the content of 
the political formula of the oligarchic régimes 
with their traditional distinction between 
liberals and conservatives. 
The notion of political legitimacy in Medina 
covers a vast historical field, without risk of 
losing analytical specificity. If we seek a compari-
son, we will find it, for example, in Marxist 
thinking, in the concept of hegemony as under-
stood by Antonio Gramsci. Medina refers to 
States, classes, governments, beliefs, ideologies, 
institutions, etc. All of this, instead of diluting 
his thought, follows a clear thread: the thread of 
trying to understand the possibility that a society 
may establish structures of governance which 
are authorized or consented to by the individual 
members of society. This means that the ques-
tion of political legitimacy is related to the capac-
ity of a people to govern itself. And this is what, 
ultimately, lies at the root of the notion of demo-
cracy. And this is what we are talking about, 
finally, when we assert the primacy of the logic 
of history over the logic of expediency. 
Hbid., p-101. nbid., p. 44. 
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Confidence in logical thinking exacts its toll 
and sometimes places us in embarrassing situa-
tions. If we follow, as I do here and have done in 
other works,10 Medina's line of thought which, 
as already pointed out, I understand to stem from 
the common root of the classics of sociology and 
politics, the description of the long period which 
begins in Latin American history with the 1929 
crisis and the changes in the 1930s gives rise to 
objections which must be dealt with. If we speak 
of legitimacy in Medina's sense (or of hegemony 
in Gramsci's sense), with the whole historical 
panorama which we have been adumbrating so 
far, the period from the 1930s onwards would 
encompass more than half a century of crisis of 
legitimacy or, if you like, more than half a cen-
tury of crisis of hegemony. The objection is that 
this would be too long a period for a crisis to 
endure. Any crisis of such long duration is held to 
transform itself into its opposite, i.e., into the 
model of its own normality. 
The biggest problem with this criticism is 
that, although it is reasonable at the level of 
mere theoretical speculation, it is nevertheless 
contradicted by history as experienced in the 
past and as experienced now by the participants 
and protagonists. The fact is that they saw (and 
still see) the history of which they were part as a 
history of crisis, and they participated in it in the 
awareness that it was indeed a crisis. At some 
points they saw the crisis as a chronic pheno 
menon but, as in the case of a chronic illness, this 
does not mean that the patient enjoys full health; 
nor does talk of a permanent crisis mean in any 
way that the society-patient is transformed into 
a stable society, i.e., one capable of establishing 
for itself the model of its own organization. 
Throughout that period it was (and remains) a 
characteristic feature of the Latin American 
mind to know that things were (and indeed 
remain) "mistaken", in some way mistaken, 
whatever the place and whatever the reasons for 
the "mistake". 
In a way, the reference to crisis implies some 
notion of historical rationality. I think that the 
L0Much of this article is based on the use which I made of 
Medina's concept and discussion of political legitimacy in my book 
O Populismo na Política Brastleira, Rio de Janeiro: Editora Paz e 
Terra, 1986, third edition, particularly in chapter 5, entitled "Libe-
ralismo y oligarquía ". 
whole period is described as being in crisis 
because the crisis, although a lengthy one, 
includes events which are not encompassed in 
what we believe, both from the theoretical view-
point and from the standard viewpoint, the 
society or the State ought to be. It seems clear to 
me that in this at least, i.e., in the awareness of 
the crisis and its emergencies, Latin Americans 
are implicitly expressing their Western affilia-
tion, i.e., their European origins and legacy, as 
Medina liked to assert. This capacity to make 
history and to criticize it has something to do 
with the Latin American condition, a condition 
which keeps step with Europe at a distance, but 
without ever separating completely, a condition 
which from its remotest origins implies having 
"maintained for so long, in complete contradic-
tion, the formulas of an ideology side by side 
with the 'beliefs' and actual behaviour of daily 
existence". In any event, it is certain that taking 
all the vicissitudes of that long historical period 
together, nothing could be worse than the cheap 
Hegelianism which, however, is sometimes 
found in the best of circles, and according to 
which "everything real is rational". Anyone who 
regards a crisis as normal because it is prolonged 
is one step from renouncing his theory, if he has 
one, and two steps from renouncing rationality. 
This type of intellectual attitude is, in truth, a 
renunciation of things intellectual. Whenever 
and wherever it held sway among us, it served 
only to explain away inequalities and it produced 
the most sinister forms of the worship of irra-
tionality and violence. 
For the moment, I can spend only a few lines 
on this period of crisis. Accordingly, I will just 
say that, although it was a period of crisis, it was 
also without doubt a period of transformation, 
an example of which is the intensification of 
industrialization and urbanization as an indica-
tor that society is creating the conditions of its 
own future reorganization. But, in the absence of 
the oligarchies or the "old classes", society lacks 
those groups which Medina calls "substitute 
élites", which can only emerge from the new 
classes which are being formed. And, without 
them, the crisis also infects the institutional sys-
tem, which is stricken by a chronic instability 
apparent in the continual threats of coups d'état 
and in political phenomena such as populism 
and military interventions, both of which are 
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attempts to fill the "vacuum", "the gap in the 
power structure". And, as is typical of any power 
structure in crisis, this one is not ruled by the 
traditional élites but nor is it capable of finding 
replacements for them. These élites hold their 
ground by means of attempts at restoration or by 
How do the dilemmas of political legitimacy 
present themselves at present? I think it is inev-
itable to begin by noting the existence of a more 
or less universal feeling of disillusionment in the 
democratic countries for the countries in transi-
tion) of Latin America. Perhaps this disillusion-
ment is not specific to the emergent 
democracies, such as Brazil, or those which are 
consolidating themselves, such as Argentina. It 
is perhaps a more general phenomenon and not 
even specific to Latin America. There is talk, for 
example, of great disillusionment in Spain with 
the democracy which has established itself since 
the decline of Francoism, now embodied in the 
socialist government. Can there be disillusion-
ment with democracy? Can there be disillusion-
ment with politics in a general sense? Are we 
returning to the political climate fraught with 
tension and disrepute which, in the 1960s, 
opened the way to the installation of the military 
régimes? Are we witnessing the preliminaries to 
an historical regression? 
The topic of political legitimacy is related to 
the more general question of the legitimacy of 
politics as such. This is particularly clear in the 
case of Brazil, but I think it can be generalized, at 
least in this aspect, to other countries of Latin 
America. In the midst of the current crisis, many 
people doubt that a solution to their problems 
can be found through politics. For example, 
there are powerful social pressures which have 
been repressed for a long time and cannot be 
dealt with immediately. Whether for this or for 
some other reason, many people —including 
both individuals and groups and social sectors— 
realize that they must solve their problems 
themselves, outside politics, and this is not to 
virtue of the strength of their traditional social 
and cultural prestige, and in any event they have 
a permanence which, although not ensuring the 
legitimacy of their claims to social domination, is 
sufficient to guarantee their survival in the corri-
dors of power. 
mention those who are convinced that their own 
and other people's problems simply have no 
prospect of solution. 
Movimeniismo and corporativism are a 
manifestation of this and they express, regard-
less of the social sector in which they emerge, an 
anxiety which causes individuals and groups to 
try to protect themselves in some way in the 
midst of the crisis. Considering only the known 
social movements and the groups equipped with 
a well-developed organizational capacity, we can 
see signs of this in the poor rural workers' move-
ments and in the teaching profession, as well as 
in the groups of bankers and industrialists. The 
reasons of economics and social justice which 
inspire such diverse groups are clearly very dif-
ferent. It is impossible to treat in the same way 
the corporativism of certain groups of bankers 
and the movimeniismo of certain popular 
groups. Nor can one fail to see the deterioration 
in the political climate, an odious climate of 
"every man for himself. 
It is a kind of Hobbesian "state of nature", a 
kind of "state of war" between the most diverse 
social groups and economic groups. A person 
who can obtain unduly large profits (or, as is 
more often the case, interest at speculative rates) 
does so without paying too much attention to the 
protests. A person who can defend himself does 
so with whatever means are available, although 
he will sometimes clash with other groups which 
have similar social interests. And a person who 
cannot exploit or lacks the capacity to defend 
himself bears the heaviest burden of the crisis 
(and of the debt). All of this takes place in the 
frenzied atmosphere created by galloping 
inflation of close to 20% a month which nobody 
III 
Modernization and democracy 
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is apparently able to control. Similar 
observations have been made by Aldo Solari and 
Jorge Graciarena concerning Uruguay and 
Argentina.11 
Perhaps we are not yet ¡n the situation José 
Medina describes somewhere in his Considera-
ciones sociológicas as generalized anomy. But we 
are drawing closer to it; at least, it is to be feared 
that one day we will find ourselves in it. It is not 
just a crisis of the State, of a State Co which is 
assigned, amongst other ills, responsibility for 
being a source of inflation and authoritarianism. 
It is also a situation of demoralization of political 
activity and of politicians themselves as figures 
acknowledged by society. If large groups of the 
civil society do not believe in politics, how will it 
be possible to contain the current of authoritar-
ianism which, recharged, continues to flow even 
after the end of the military régimes, as is dem-
onstrated by the admittedly very different exam-
ples of Argentina and Brazil? But more 
important than that: if there is widespread disil-
lusionment with the democracies which recently 
came into being, what of their chances of 
consolidation? 
However, I do not believe that everything 
consists of problems and difficulties. Despite its 
recent experience of dictatorship, Uruguay is 
probably the best example available in Latin 
America of how the modernization of a society 
can sustain a democratic political culture. The 
same sort of thing can be said about Argentina, 
at least with respect to the party system. But, 
even in the case of Brazil, where the agrarian 
way of life and tradition are much stronger, the 
process of political transition —driven forward 
by the struggles of democratic resistance and the 
"According to the records of the seminar on Changing 
Development Styles in the Future of Latin America, Graciarena 
wonders, for example, about the possible significance for society of 
generalization of the conflicts in the public services. Although he 
does not believe in a general trend towards social disintegration, he 
acknowledges that eventually "very strong phenomena of disinte-
gration may appear". Solari also mentions the question of the 
strikes in the public services, which did not occur under Uruguay's 
military régime (or under such régimes in other countries) because 
they were repressed: "In contrast, the public services are now 
interrupted quite often and this produces the phenomena menti-
oned by Graciarena (...) for example, the strikes of health workers, 
of which there have been several, cause widespread irritation, even 
among post-office workers, who have also struck from time to 
time." 
strictly political struggles— has also advanced 
under the pressure, extra-political as it were, of 
the modernization of society, i.e., the intensifica-
tion of the processes of urbanization and indus-
trialization. These processes, of course, date 
from long before the existence of the military 
régime but they have acquired a new rhythm in 
recent decades. 
It can be said in the case of Brazil that the 
transformation of democracy into a generally 
accepted value, i.e., into a cardinal element of the 
political culture, is a recent phenomenon pro-
duced by the circumstances of the period of 
struggle against the military régime (in the case 
of Uruguay, it must have related to much earlier 
periods). But, even in the case of Brazil, we can 
also say that this generalization of democracy as 
a value owes something to the circumstances of 
economic and social crisis which accompanied 
the process of democratic transition and which 
persist today. In circumstances in which the cri-
sis multiplies the conflicts and spreads them 
throughout the society, democracy may appear 
to be an effective mechanism for building a satis-
factory political order. It appears to be so, if not 
for the majority of the society, then at least for 
the majority of those who, during and since the 
dictatorship, have fought to participate in 
politics. 
I mean that what appears to be a problem 
from one angle, i.e., the threat of generalized 
anomy, may also appear to be a favourable condi-
tion, depending on the capacity of the leaders 
and the institutions to tackle the problem. The 
same can be said of the effects of the crisis as can 
be said of the crisis itself. Movimentismo and 
corporativism may be regarded not only as fac-
tors of political deterioration but also as the 
means, at the outset politically chaotic and con-
fused, by which the normal confrontation of 
interests in a modern and democratic society is 
achieved. It should also be remembered that the 
conversion of democracy into a generally 
accepted value also means that the society 
retains a sharp memory of a time when the 
military régime controlled the conflicts in an 
authoritarian and of course very unsatisfactory 
manner, at least for the majority of the partici-
pants (or of those who aspired to participation). 
Clearly, the signs of the existence of such a 
memory will tend to be much more visible in 
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Uruguay and Argentina, more modern societies 
in which the military régimes caused much more 
damage than in Brazil. 
In this same connection it is worth recalling the 
point made by Luciano Martins about the establish-
ment in recent decades of what he calls a capitalist 
ethos in Brazilian society.12 This phenomenon, 
which probably occurred much earlier in Argentina, 
Uruguay and Chile, has become widespread in 
Brazil, spreading even to those regions where many 
social relations of the pre-capitalist type still persist. 
Martins is thus describing a process of transforma-
tion, already observed from other angles by other 
researchers, which has led not only to the moderni-
zation through the "economic miracle" of the struc-
tural bases of the country's capitalist system, but also 
to the generalization of the values and standards of 
social and economic conduct required by a modern 
capitalist system. To express this same idea using 
Medina's concepts, even in places where models 
originating from the property system persist, the 
basis of what determines the whole of social life now 
originates in the business and urban system. 
Do the celebrated advantages of backwardness 
really exist? Can Brazil be said to have benefited in 
some way from having arrived at modernization late 
in comparison with Argentina, Uruguay and 
Chile?li Although it is not possible to speak in 
general terms of advantages or disadvantages, there 
is at least one significant aspect which has to be 
attributed to the country's relative backwardness. 
Brazil's authoritarian régime cannot be accused of 
having destroyed the country's economy, a charge 
frequently levelled against Argentina's military 
regime. In Brazil, the military gave its reply, clearly a 
very authoritarian one, to the reformist claims pres-
ented by Brazilian society in the 1960s: repression of 
the popular movements which were seeking social 
reforms, and takeover of all the reformist claims 
which necessitated economic changes or other 
claims which might lead to modernization of the 
country's capitalist system. These include the reform 
12l refer to a statement made by Luciano Martins at the Centre 
for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CEDEC) of S5b Paulo in 1987, 
during a series of seminars on the Brazilian transition. 
"I would like to recall in this context the comparative ana-
lyses of the countries of the Southern Cone made by Fernando 
Fajnzylber concerning economic development and social inequal-
ity, and by Carlos Filgueira concerning social mobility, presented at 
the II Forum on the Southern Cone organized by 1LDES at Colonia, 
Uruguay, in July 1985. 
of the tax system and the public administration, the 
modernization of the postal service and communica-
tions services in general, the new financial mecha-
nisms for attracting savings, the rationalization (and 
concentration) of the banking system, etc. Without 
forgetting the areas in which the military regime's 
reforms took the direction, not of an alternative to 
the earlier reformist movements but of counter-
reforms, including the reform of university educa-
tion (a response to the student's reformist 
movements), the creation of the Brazilian Literacy 
Movement (MOBRAL) (a response to the adult 
literacy movements, mostly of Leftist origins), 
and the adoption of the Rural Worker Statute (a 
response to the movements seeking agrarian 
reform). 
However, some questions must still be 
asked. In view of the current difficulties of Braz-
il's democratization, certainly greater than those 
of Uruguay and Argentina, can it be said that the 
earlier "success" of the military régime is favou-
rable or unfavourable for the prospects of demo-
cratic consolidation? But there is yet another 
question. With all their differences of perfor-
mance, which correspond to the differences 
between the national societies in which they 
emerged, have not the military régimes, despite 
themselves and owing both to their "successes" 
and to their "failures", arrived at the common 
result of the final removal of the old agrarian (or 
pastoral) societies which all those countries were 
in the past? Both in the cases in which their 
modernization policies, all of neoliberal cut and 
following more or less the same models, were 
successful and in the cases in which they failed, it 
seems clear that after the departure of the mil-
itary régimes we are also witnessing the burial of 
what still remained of the images of those socie-
ties as agrarian ones. This means that, at least in 
the countries of the Southern Cone (including 
Brazil in this instance), the dilemmas of political 
legitimacy and the corresponding problems of 
the construction of democracy are now primarily 
problems of modern urban societies. This of 
course is not enough to solve the inherent diffi-
culties of the conquest and consolidation of 
democracy in those countries, but it at least 
offers the consolation that the first place among 
these difficulties is no longer occupied by the 
typical problems of agrarian societies of the tra-
ditional and oligarchic type. 
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IV 
Legitimacy and political institutions 
What are the differences between the dilemmas 
of political legitimacy as they present them-
selves in the present and as they presented 
themselves in the past? In this case it is impor-
tant to deal with a problem which was only 
implicit in my exposition and was taken up, 
expanded and clarified by Adolfo Gurrieri.14 It is 
possible to speak of political legitimacy for tradi-
tional societies, Gurrieri says, because they 
achieved some coherence in what Medina called 
their material, ideological and political "sup-
ports". They achieved some coherence between 
the system of property, the oligarchic ruling 
class, the party system (liberals against conser-
vatives) and liberalism as a political formula. 
Gurrieri does not fail to note, now referring to 
the present period of crisis, that the material 
conditions have evolved towards a modern and 
industrial society, but he holds, together with 
Graciarena, that in this process the concentra-
tion of power in society has reached such a point 
that things have apparently become even more 
difficult. He says: "There is a basic and appar-
ently increasing inconsistency between the 
material support and our democratic Utopias." 
Hence the question which he suggests: does not 
such a situation make the erosion, if not of 
democracies, at least of democratic govern-
ments, very probable? Instead of democracy 
serving to change society, ¡s it not doomed to 
have to adapt itself to the existing society and 
power structure? 
In attempting to answer such questions, I 
would say at the outset, within the framework of 
a brief historical comparison, that the dilemmas 
of political legitimacy, as we can observe them in 
the 1980s, suggest a quite different picture from 
what Medina could discern in the 1960s. It is not 
a less worrying picture; perhaps it is even more 
worrying, but in any event it is quite different. 
Firstly, while in the 1960s the system of prop-
erty, although in crisis, still allowed the hypothe-
sis of a restoration of the oligarchy, but it seems 
14I refer to the debates at the seminar on Changing Develop-
ment Styles in the Future of Latin America. 
clear that such a possibility is quite out of sight in 
the 1980s. Whatever our prospects for the future 
may be, it seems clear that the "old classes" have 
finally begun the decline leading to their disap-
pearance as a power factor. For better or worse, 
the social system of those countries is now a 
business and urban one. 
Secondly, the Weberian question about the 
ruling class clearly still obtains: the "old class" no 
longer rules and the new one still does not have 
the capacity to rule. But after the military 
régimes which, with their authoritarianism, 
denied civil society any opportunity of ruling, the 
old question of the ruling class would have to be 
asked from a totally different platform and is 
perhaps not as difficult as might be imagined. 
Some people, on the basis of the growth of 
corporativism and movimentismo, will conclude 
that in a period of prolonged crisis moderniza-
tion, i.e., urbanization and industrialization, do 
not contribute to the formation of classes capa-
ble of political leadership. Taking a view which I 
described earlier as less ambitious and more real-
istic with respect to classes and to the ruling 
classes in particular, it seems to me that the 
social sectors at present occupied with movi-
mentismo and corporativism are simply making 
their first attempt at social participation and will 
eventually assume their political responsibili-
ties. Provided, that is, that politics offers suitable 
institutional conditions for such a development. 
Thirdly, the greatest difficulty lies precisely 
in the institutional question. In the 1960s José 
Medina saw the root of the crisis of legitimacy in 
the collapse of the traditional bipartisan system: 
"the break-up of the traditional bipartisan union 
accompanying the decline of the system of prop-
erty is the result of the profound transformation 
described earlier, it is the consequence of the 
emergence of new middle classes —urban and 
partly rural—, it stems from the collapse into 
ideological confusion which accompanies or 
mixes with these same phenomena".15 In this 
"Medina Echavarría, op. cit., p. 96. 
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case, the situation remains, mutatis mutandis, 
very similar in the fundamental terms of the 
problems. In the 1980s, this association between 
modernization —which Medina expresses in 
this case as the rise of new classes— the crisis of 
power (or of legitimacy) and the institutional 
question —which Medina represents by the 
question of parties— would have to be not only 
reaffirmed but vigorously asserted, for the phe-
nomenon of "collapse into ideological confu-
sion" are now much more violent than at any 
time in our past. 
In my opinion, and here I take up a vital 
aspect of the problems raised by Gurrieri, the 
coherence between the material, ideological and 
political "supports" does not come about but is 
brought about. And this is a task primarily for 
the political institutions, especially the parties. 
As it happens, in the 1980s the "weak link" in 
the chain between modernization, power (legiti-
macy) and institutions (parties) is the political 
institutions themselves, specifically the parties. 
Despite the progress made in this area, notably 
in Argentina and Uruguay, which are the most 
modern countries of the Southern Cone, prob-
lems persist that are typical of a poorly resolved, 
or even unresolved, process of construction of 
parties. Uruguay still has a system of "traditional 
parties" which operate more like electoral 
legends than as bodies capable of integrating 
demands and determining governmental poli-
cies. The Frente Amplio (Broad Front) the 
"third player" in the game, is the new factor 
which may be expected to contribute to the 
modernization of the whole party system. 
The case of Argentina, a subject of so much 
pessimism in military and economic affairs, is 
perhaps the one which offers greatest hopes 
with respect to parties. Especially since its last 
two electoral experiences: the first, which 
elected Alfonsin's Radicals and threw out the 
Peronists, the first reverse suffered by them in 
the open field of democratic struggle, for up till 
then they had been beaten only by armed force; 
the second, in which the Peronists, instead of 
distancing themselves as observers of the demo-
cratic game, reaffirmed their commitment to 
democracy and beat the Radicals in that same 
democratic field. While it is true, as Robert Dahl 
says, that democracy begins at the point when 
—after long years of conflict— the adversaries 
realize that the effort to eliminate each other is 
more trouble than coexisting with each other, we 
can perhaps justify the hypothesis that the latest 
electoral contests in Argentina marked the 
beginning of a modern and stable party system. 
For such a turnaround to happen, it must be 
supposed that the two main adversaries will 
have to draw a little closer together at the very 
time when the contest is becoming more desper-
ate. This, means that both of them will have 
demonstrated their support for the democracy 
which guarantees them the opportunity to com-
pete and that they will have isolated the enemies 
of democracy.16 
Although it has the advantage of the vigour 
imparted by its recent economic growth and 
modernization, the Brazilian situation emerges 
as perhaps the worst when one examines the 
institutional question and, in particular, the 
party question. If we limit the discussion to the 
big parties, those which at present bear the 
major responsibility for running the State, the 
picture is a dismal one. Brazil has big political 
parties which, however, do not form govern-
ments and therefore do not assume State respon-
sibilities. They are parties which exist only for 
electoral purposes and to cater to the interests of 
their clients. The big political parties now have 
something in common with the "traditional par-
ties" of Uruguay but, unfortunately, without that 
country's democratic political culture. Govern-
ment policies are not explained until after the 
elections. In many cases they are not explained 
until after the party comes to power; or even 
later, after the government, once elected, begins 
to form its ministries or departments. At this 
time, which is one of debate about policies and 
disputes about posts and sinecures, a separation 
instead of a consolidation begins to occur 
between the government and its party. From 
this point the government parties begin to put 
out signals that they are not responsible for the 
government, to which they are connected only 
through those politicians who, in their personal 
lûIt would be interesting to see whether this generalization 
holds good for the small Argentinian parties. Although ¡n some-
what différent terms, 1 find indications that such a hypothesis could 
be formulated in an interview given by Guillerno O'Donell to 
Jornal do Brasil, which appeared under the title "Bendito susto" on 
24 January 1988. 
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capacity, have been appointed to ministries, 
departments or some office which they consider 
important. 
The case of Brazil illustrates, in a negative 
sense, the importance of the parties for the con-
solidation of a régime of political legitimacy. We 
do not have strong parties; accordingly, we have 
a fragile democracy. But democracy is defended 
and has so far survived. How? Democracy in 
Brazil is not defended or practised in an organ-
ized manner through political parties, but in a 
diffuse manner through political movements, 
A régime of political legitimacy is only possible 
under a democratic system. This is the great 
topic on the historical agenda of our countries at 
the present time. It is what emerges as funda-
mental from a comparison of the dilemmas of 
political legitimacy of the 1960s and the 1980s, 
and this is because democracy is the only system 
which organizes, i.e., institutionalizes, the con-
sent of the people, without which legitimacy 
perishes. And this is the only model available to 
us in our effort to determine the dilemmas of 
political legitimacy in the present time.17 
There are times when the great political 
battle is fought between dictatorship and demo-
cracy. Chile in the time of Allende and the Brazil 
of Joao Goulart, each with its own peculiar fea-
tures, are clear cases of the struggle between a 
democracy of the Left (Allende) and a populist 
democracy (Goulart) and dictatorships of the 
"Dictatorships, of whatever kind, mobilize. But régimes of 
political legitimacy, in the best of cases, usually demobilize. They 
may ¡n fact mobilize but they do not institutionalize. To institu-
tionalize means to establish a legitimate régime, i.e., the pre-
eminence of the law —the rule of law. In a mobilization, the 
supreme value is not in the law, i.e., in institutions, but in the 
person of the leader or in the party which is doing the mobilizing. 
The paradigm of mobilization is general mobilization in time of 
war, the mobilization of an army, etc. In the institutionalization of 
democracy, the highest value is not in the person of the leader or of 
the ruling party, but in the institutional rules which allow persons 
to organize the space of their own freedom. 
which most of the time lack any clear identity. 
They are political movements which exist some-
times only in the cultural sense of the word, 
without even being aware of their own exist-
ence; they are mere emanations of the moderni-
zation process and of a sense of the worth of 
democracy which still resists disillusionment. 
This is a sign of the strength and the weakness of 
democracy in Brazil. It is a strong democracy 
because it is rooted in the material "supports", in 
the "strength of things", but very weak from the 
institutional standpoint. 
Right. There are several more recent examples 
of what the battles between dictatorships and 
democracies mean in the history of the Latin 
American countries which have had the expe-
rience of military dictatorships. There are also 
times in which the great battle is fought between 
a different forms of dictatorship: the Russian 
revolution is an obvious example, but by no 
means a unique one, of the struggle between a 
dictatorship of the Right and a dictatorship of 
the Left, a struggle which, as elsewhere, was 
resolved in favour of the Left. There are several 
examples of this kind, especially from the 1930s, 
which were nevertheless resolved in favour of 
dictatorships of the Right. 
But there are also times —and I think that 
ours is one of them— in which the great battle is 
fought on the terrain of democracy. It can be said 
that this is basically a great historical battle over 
the meaning of democracy. In Argentina, an 
activist of the (Peronist) Justicialist Party will 
have a different view of democracy, perhaps very 
different from the view of an activist of the 
Radical Civic Union. In Brazil, an activist of the 
Workers' Party (PT) certainly has a view of 
democracy which is quite different from that of a 
militant of the Party of the Brazilian Democratic 
Movement (PMDB), and these two views of 
democracy will differ in many respects from the 
view of an activist of the Liberal Front Party 
(PLF) or even more from that of the Social 
V 
Democracy and reform 
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Democratic Party (PDS). But I maintain that in 
both countries these and other political forces 
will be obliged to advocate their view of demo-
cracy and to fight their fight over the meaning of 
democracy on the terrain of democracy. 
These countries in transition will perhaps 
come to have a representative democracy of the 
traditional liberal type, or a modern liberal 
democracy, i.e., with some social content, or a 
modern mass democracy, with broad popular 
participation, or a modern socialist democracy, 
i.e., of the masses, representative and pluralist, 
but also with various mechanisms for direct par-
ticipation. Yet other hypotheses are possible. 
For example, it is very possible that in some 
countries, such as Brazil, democracies of a defi-
nitely conservative cut will prevail in the end. In 
any event, what is certain is that the debate about 
the meaning of democracy is a paramount issue 
of our times. No political force which aspires to 
power, or better still to hegemony, and which 
can therefore put itself forward as a representa-
tive of social forces capable of exercising the 
functions of a ruling class in society, can simply 
ignore it. A regime of political legitimacy can 
only be democratic, and the definition of what is 
understood by democracy is a fundamental com-
ponent of the policies of any class which seeks to 
exercise the functions of a ruling class at the 
present time. 
In the conditions of Latin America, the 
debate about democracy is a debate about politi-
cal legitimacy and therefore about the political 
and institutional forms essential to legitimacy.18 
But it is also a debate about the effectiveness of 
democracy; the fact of viewing democracy prim-
arily from the angle of legitimacy "cannot stop 
us recognizing that democracy can die of ineffec-
tiveness". 19 It is clearly not a question of subordi-
nating the value of democracy to economic 
growth. Quite the contrary, for as Medina says, 
"when it comes to the pinch, legitimacy is more 
ieI omit from the text, and also from my statement, an 
important question which Palma emphasized in the debates: those 
who can see in political democracy only elections and parties are 
also incapable of seeing that the "mere" establishment of a political 
democracy requires the prior establishment of fairly complex social 
conditions which do not obtain in many countries of Latin Amer-
ica. This means that the conquest of political democracy may entail 
the need to make much larger changes than anticipated. 
'^Medina Echavarría, op. cit. 
important than effectiveness". I recall that in his 
analysis of the relations between democracy and 
wealth José Medina advocated democracy as a 
value in itself in the clearest possible manner: "... 
in the Latin American situation, it was particu-
larly important to underline the aspects of legiti-
macy. And since there has been ample reference 
above to the 'materialist' correlation of demo-
cracy and wealth, it is right to stress now the 
'idealist' version, which emphasizes above all 
else the value of beliefs, the weight of age-old 
'intangible conventions' (value of the political 
system, value of the legitimately constituted 
authority, value of the rules of the game, value of 
the dialogue between equals, value of the human 
significance of reasonable compromise)".20 
There are certainly people in the Latin 
America of today who want democracy "at the 
cheapest possible cost". As Enzo Faletto and 
Aníbal Quijano would say, there are those who 
understand that reform might place democracy 
in danger and who would therefore prefer to 
limit it to a minimum. These are the people who, 
as Faletto says, would seem to understand the 
subject of democracy in the following terms: 
"Let us preserve democracy but let us not change 
things much in order to preserve democracy." In 
this case, we are heading towards the paradox of 
a democracy which, in order to survive, must 
avoid conflicts as far as possible. Or, as Quijano 
puts it: "If democracy becomes merely a forum 
for negotiations and conciliation, then every-
thing is watered down, for nothing really under-
goes any important change in any area of daily 
life." Clearly, it is possible that inquiries into the 
effectiveness of democracy are not superficial 
inquiries but inquiries into its content, i.e., into 
its true significance. If democracy does not exist 
as an arena of conflicts, what is the point of 
democracy?21 
Once proper differences are established in 
the hierarchical values, it must be recognized 
that questions of social and economic life cannot 
be regarded as alien to the meaning of a modern 
democracy. We all know that one of the impor-
tant engines of democratization is increased 
employment, correction of extreme social 
mlbid., p. 146. 
Jl
 Again, I refer to the participation of these researchers in the 
debates at the seminar on Changing Development Styles in the 
Future of Latin America. 
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inequality, income redistribution, etc. The ques-
tion of the building of institutions, i.e., the char-
acteristic question of political democracy, leads 
on to the topic of social democracy and therefore 
to the topic of a policy of economic and social 
reforms.22 Depending on the parties, interests 
and classes, there will be different notions as to 
what the reforms should be, how they should be 
carried out and whom they should benefit. After 
the decline of the "old classes" it is hard to 
imagine any "new class" —be it the bourgeoisie, 
the working class, the "middle classes" or any 
other conceivable class that might emerge— 
which can aspire to be a "ruling class" in society 
without offering society a prospect of reforms, 
which later will have to be converted into a 
policy of reforms.23 
There is something more. From the 1930s to 
the 1950s, these topics emerged on a national 
scale, i.e., in each country, and adequate replies 
were found at that level. José Medina mentions, 
for example, that one of the historic tasks of 
Latin America was the task of national 
integration, understood as the integration of 
peoples into one nation, the question of 
structural dualism, the question of cultural 
heterogeneity, etc. It is possible that many of 
these questions remain on the historical agenda 
of most of the Latin American nations. I think, 
however, that it is now vital to reassert the 
The dilemmas of political legitimacy, because 
they refer to the path and direction which society 
will have to take, have given rise today, as in the 
1930s and 1960s, to a debate on the big themes of 
"This topic, a traditional one ¡n political thought in modern 
times, was taken up again recently, in the framework of the Latin 
American debate, by Fernando Calderón and Mario dos Santos. See 
the documents presented by these authors to the symposium on 
Democracy, Totalitacianism and Socialism, held at the School of 
Advanced Studies in Social Sciences, Paris, January 1987. 
"I mention in passing, as this would be a topic for another 
occasion, that while reforms, no matter what their origin or inspi-
ration, are essential to the building of asoliddemocracy.democracy 
importance of another topic, also dealt with by 
Medina. I refer to the need for Latin American 
integration, if not the integration of all of the 
countries of the region —an unlikely prospect in 
present circumstances— then at least the 
integration of the countries which share a 
community of interests and which already offer 
the possibility of union. There have been some 
successes in the efforts to achieve Latin 
American integration which should encourage 
new efforts in that direction. 
The truth is that, in the framework of an 
international order which is also in crisis and 
undergoing redefinition, most of the Latin 
American countries would encounter enormous 
and perhaps insuperable difficulties in achieving 
viability as modern and democratic societies. 
There are always exceptions, but for the majority 
the question of integration is an urgent one: 
either they integrate with each other in order 
jointly to assert their international independ-
ence or they integrate with some bit Power, but 
in a subordinate position. What does the concept 
of sovereignty mean for the majority of the Latin 
American States when, in the present situation, 
they have to argue the issue of foreign debt with 
the international financial system? And it should 
not be forgotten, for all its current importance, 
that this issue is merely one example. We all 
know that there are several others. 
the political and economic development of the 
countries of Latin America. Thus, this new 
theme (is it really new?) of the institutional 
construction of democracy is joined on the his-
is not always essential to reforms. Throughout its history, Brazil 
has been an example in which reforms are an issue between the 
Liberals and the Leftists, but they only become a question of policy 
when they pass into the hands of the Conservatives, usually by 
authoritarian means. Examples of this are the abolition of slavery 
under the Empire, the social legislation adopted under the Vargas 
dictatorship, and the recent reforms carried out by the military 
regime. 
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torical agenda by the themes of the transforma-
tion of society and the viability of the countries 
of the region as nations. This is the great debate 
which now engages, or ought to engage, the 
classes which seek to become leaders one day, 
and it is a debate in which the intellectuals par-
ticipate, or ought to participate, be they 
"organic", "traditional" or of any other kind. 
In these circumstances it is essential for us to 
return to the debates about projects and models 
which were very much in vogue in the 1930s and 
the 1960s but which have now fallen completely 
out of fashion. It is clearly not a question of 
repeating the dogmatism, whether romantic or 
vulgar, of the models of the 1960s, with their 
implicit (or sometimes explicit) authoritarian-
ism, their illuminism and their elitism. Nor is it 
claimed that the resumption of the debate about 
projects and models means that we will merely 
repeat them or define them in the same way as 
before. However, it happens that we cannot con-
tinue without some kind of overall view of these 
societies, if we seek to make them workable, if 
we seek to reform (or transform) them and if we 
seek to make democracy workable through them. 
In other words, if we seek to rediscover the 
"coherence" of their "supports". 
In a very interesting article Adam 
Przeworski talks of democracy as a "contingent 
outcome of conflicts". This phrase is translated 
into Brazilian Portuguese in a very free but 
suggestive way: ama a incerteza e seras 
democrático.24 My conviction, in contrast to 
Przeworski's is that democracy in Latin America 
must be, in addition to a contingent outcome of 
conflicts, a political programme not, or at least 
not necessarily, a party programme, but certainly 
a programme of several parties which, despite 
their many differences on other issues, will have 
to propose the building of democracy as the first 
of their priorities. Moreover, it will have to be a 
programme not only of the parties, no matter 
how pluralist and numerous they may be, but 
also of intellectual, cultural, religious, trade-
union and professional institutions. In short: it 
will have to be an organized culture. If in Latin 
"Adam Przeworski, "Ama a incerteza e seras democrático", 
in the review Noros estados, Analysis and Planning Centre of 
Brazil (CEBRAP). 
America we gi\e free rein to the "spontaneous" 
interplay of forces, as if we were in the presence 
of an already established political market, we 
will probably get something much worse than a 
return to the military régimes. It is very possible 
that, in the economic, social and political 
circumstances prevailing in the countries of the 
region, we may get a deterioration of political 
values, and manifestations of social 
degeneration and economic stagnation which 
will fully restore the verisimilitude of Medina's 
theory about the risk of generalized anomy, with 
all the awful and at present largely unforeseeable 
consequences to which such a situation might 
Jead. 
There were many changes in Latin America 
between the 1960s and the 1980s, but there was 
no change in the urgency, "the awareness of this 
urgency", as Medina puts it. This awareness of 
urgency is today, as it was 20 years ago, "the 
essential characteristic of the contemporary 
Latin American scene". At the beginning of the 
1960s, i.e., before the 1964 coup d'état in Brazil 
and the series of coups d'état in several other 
countries, Medina issued a similar warning. But 
at that time Medina conceded the possibility of 
the restoration of oligarchies, which did not 
happen, and of military interventions, which 
did, introducing an era of sad memory in our 
history. It seems to me that in the present situa-
tion, with the possibility of oligarchic restora-
tion excluded, and the probability of new 
military interventions reduced by_ the extent of 
their own decline, it is perhaps not the phantom 
of regression which causes the greatest fears. If 
the prospect of democracy collapses, we may 
perhaps be condemned to something much 
worse than anything we have lived through in 
the recent past. In the 1960s Medina used to talk 
about Weimar and what came after it, but those 
images seem too distant from us to be regarded 
as possible. Perhaps we no longer have in view a 
totalitarianism in the style of Hitler or Stalin. 
Perhaps we should feel more reassured because 
we believe that historical regressions of that 
kind are no longer possible? One of the most 
important functions of the intellectual is to 
watch out for dangers and to warn of them, and if 
possible to propose means of avoiding them. 
José Medina Echavarria is an exemplar of 
the important roles which intellectuals can play 
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in circumstances such as the ones we are expe-
riencing at present. These roles are to collect 
information, organize knowledge and, if possi-
ble, advocate great ideals which safeguard the 
meaning of politics and of the logic of history. I 
believe that I do justice to the memory of José 
Medina, and to my own convictions, when I say 
that the functions of intellectuals, in this world 
in crisis in which we live, also include the protec-
tion of Utopias, of liberal or socialist Utopias or 
any others that can be imagined (and let us not 
forget that liberalism, as Medina says, following 
Ortega y Gasset, is a "Utopia": "it is the decision 
to coexist with the enemy; i.e., the capacity for 
dialogue and compromise"). But there will have 
to be democratic Utopias and models which 
inspire the building of democracy and the trans-
formation of a society which still has a long road 
to travel before it can stand confirmed as a demo-
cratic society. 
These functions of the intellectual in politics 
are not to be confused with the party choices 
which individual intellectuals may make, for, in 
the strict sense, party options are options of 
citizens. As citizens, intellectuals have, as indeed 
do other citizens, the right to join (or not to join) 
political parties. But if an intellectual joins a 
party, he had better be aware that this does not 
release him from his duties as an intellectual 
And those duties concern the collection of infor-
mation, the organization of knowledge and the 
construction of the grand prospects of a demo-
cratic and civilized society, duties which bind 
him, beyond considerations of his party, to the 
whole of society. 
The discussion of the work of José Medina 
Echavarría who, although not a party man, was 
nevertheless a citizen of fine political sensibility, 
perhaps offers an opportunity to preserve the 
role of the intellectuals in politics, of intellectu-
als who, either within or outside the parties, 
place themselves in the service of the logic of 
history, and of the building of democracy. 
(Translated from Portuguese into Spanish, and 
from Spanish into English) 
